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Abstract 
Signature biometrics is a widely used form of user authentication. As a behavioural biometric, samples 
have inherent inconsistencies which must be accounted for within an automated system. Performance 
deterioration of a tuned biometric software system may be caused by an interaction error with a 
biometric capture device, however, using conventional error metrics, system and user interaction 
errors are combined, thereby masking the contribution by each element. In this paper we explore the 
application of the Human-Biometric Sensor Interaction (HBSI) model to signature as an exemplar of a 
behavioural biometric. Using observational data collected from a range of subjects, our study shows 
that usability issues can be identified specific to individual capture device technologies. While most 
interactions are successful, a range of common interaction errors need to be mitigated by design to 
reduce overall error rates. 
1. Introduction 
This study is aimed at understanding the user interaction with biometric implementations, referring 
to technologies that capture and assess physical or behavioural characteristics of persons, most 
prominently for purposes of security and identity. Accurately understanding how a user interacts with 
biometrics in order to maximize the accuracy performance of the system; the user’s experience is of 
critical importance given the recent widespread deployment of systems across large and varied 
populations (such as in passports and identity cards), and the anticipated growth in usage over the 
coming decades [1]. Conventional methods of performance evaluation for biometrics focus on error 
rates in recognition [2] using metrics such as ‘false rejection rate’ and ‘false acceptance rate’ relating 
to genuine rejection and impostor access respectively. While other statistical measures exist (for 
example ‘failure to acquire’ which assesses the rate at which the biometric sensor is unable to capture 
a sample) these metrics provide statistics on how well the overall algorithmic/sensor implementation 
performs. Although adequate for calculating performance, these metrics do not indicate how this 
performance was affected by the user interacting with the system [3]. When deployed within a public 
setting it has been noted that performance of a system drops, not because of a change in the 
algorithmic implementation, but purely due to the nature of the user interaction with the technology 
not adhering to the expected methodology, typically due to unfamiliarity with the system, poor user 
instructions, positioning with respect to the sensor resulting in poor sample capture, or a combination 
of these factors [4]. With frontline deployment of what might be described as immature technology, 
accurate assessment of user interaction is timely and of paramount importance as a research issue [5]. 
In an attempt to assess, understand and react to biometric systems usability issues, the HBSI model 
was developed [6] to present a user-centric assessment of performance, enabling usage errors to be 
decomposed and attributed to a multitude of factors including incorrect user interaction, performance 
modification due to ergonomics and user interface, and error in sampling/poor quality of sample, 
alongside conventional measurements of algorithmic performance. Adopting this model it is possible 
for developers, integrators and end-users to pinpoint exactly where usage error occurs. The original 
HBSI model was developed for biometric fingerprint collection, a modality which relies on the 
instantaneous capture of a fingerprint image. This process, also used in other physiological modalities 
such as iris, hand geometry and face, relies upon performance and usability assessments at a single 
moment in time within the HBSI model. While further studies have demonstrated the agility of the 
model within an instantaneous context [7], the original model did not allow for the analysis of 
temporal/behavioural biometric modalities – systems which capture and analyse a sequence of events 
to prove identity, examples of which include movement analysis and dynamic signature. Furthermore 
many deployed biometric implementations use multiple modalities alongside other non-biometric 
user interaction requirements (in so called complex systems), such as the presentation of a token or 
entering of a personal identification number (PIN), all of which require an overall temporal assessment 
of a system’s usage. An example of this is the recently introduced automated biometric passport gates 
found at numerous border control posts. Here the user approaches a kiosk, enters the passport into a 
reader, has a facial image captured, retrieves the passport and passes through (if successful). Although 
the primary biometric (face) is physiological, the overall interaction is behavioural. 
 
Dynamic signature systems are a widely adopted behavioural biometric that have shown to perform 
well in comparison against other biometric systems [8]. The signature modality is widely accepted by 
society as a legally admissible form of authentication and because of this, the modality has particularly 
high take-up within the financial, legal and commercial transaction sectors. As a behavioural 
biometric, identity is attributed on how a subject signs a signature based both on the final signature 
‘image’ but also the temporal constructional aspects of production. Alongside other behavioural 
biometric systems a signature sample will have inherent variability, which partially explains higher 
error rates than other physiological biometrics such as iris or face. In assessing usability and signer 
interaction with a signature capture device it is important to consider interactions with the device 
from the start of signing until the end of the entire capture process and incorporate any modifications 
to the signing process and interaction errors with the capture device. 
 
In this paper we will explore the application of the HBSI model to the dynamic signature modality. By 
investigating how subjects use a range of common signature technologies to enrol and verify, we 
explore how and why interaction errors occur and use the HBSI to metricize both system and user 
related performance errors. The analyses enable a thorough understanding of where common errors 
are introduced within signature systems and enhance the granularity of attributing errors. In turn, this 
analysis can assist in the design of signature systems from software, device ergonomics and user 
instruction point of view. 
 
2. Signature Systems and Interaction Assessment 
As discussed, biometric systems for human identification can be broadly defined into two categories: 
physiological biometrics related to physical characteristic of a person (for example, facial image, 
fingerprint, iris pattern) and behavioural biometrics related to how a person performs an action (for 
example walking pattern/gait). In general physiological biometrics can be captured in an instant 
whereas behavioural biometrics require a capture period of a number of samples resulting in a single 
presentation over a (short) period of time. In assessing usability aspects of biometric systems it’s 
therefore critical to establish interaction levels appropriate to the nature of the technology. With 
respect to behavioural biometrics, this means assessing interaction across the entire capture period. 
Biometric identification through signature production is an example of a behavioural biometric in that 
recognition processes analyse how a subject produces a signature. Signature assessment is performed 
either on a ‘static’ basis, by examining the completed signature image (the conventional point-of-sale 
scenario when comparing a signature on the reverse of a credit card to that donated at the payment 
counter), or on a ‘dynamic’ basis where temporal aspects of the signature performance are assessed 
including pen positions, velocities, and other metrics. 
Static signatures can be captured using a conventional scanner, while dynamic signature require the 
use of a specialized digitising/tablet device that is able to capture pen status information as a signer 
writes on a surface using a stylus. With these devices, stylus position, pressure and tilt are captured 
alongside a time offset during signature capture. These devices may or may not provide ‘ink’ feedback 
to the signer (either as virtual ink on a back projected tablet surface or actual physical ink from a pen 
writing on an overlaid sheet of paper) during this process. Tablet devices using finger motion 
interaction have become increasingly ubiquitous with devices running operating systems such as iOS 
and Android, revolutionizing interaction design. Future developments for signature assessment may 
encompass finger-based singing alongside the conventional stylus input method. 
A number of studies have examined different signature technologies and their effects on signing 
capabilities. Many aspects of the sensor design will affect the user acceptance as well as overall 
usability. Some factors that can affect the way a user interactions with the sensor include the size, 
shape, grip, and stylus of the device [9]. Users also inherently prefer the biometric device to be at a 
certain height level [10]. If the device is not at an optimal height or angle for user comfort, additional 
errors may occur as the user simply cannot easily use the system. As the market changes and there is 
a shift towards mobile systems on tablets and smartphones, additional factors such as lighting, screen 
sensitivity and weight will impact the usability of the device. These factors, along with their usage on 
different operating systems will create a need for greater interoperability of signatures. 
Interoperability in signature systems is a two-fold process. The first type of interoperability occurs 
with the end signature result. Different devices need to be able to yield the same signature so that 
multiple devices can be used without any loss of performance. Interoperability also refers to the 
interaction procedure between the human and the device. Different systems should follow the same 
steps and procedures in order to prevent additional user systems that are unique to only specific 
devices. HBSI errors may sometimes be unique to specific devices [11] and will vary greatly between 
mobile and non-mobile environments. 
2.1 The Human-Biometric Sensor Interaction 
The evaluation method for this study originates from traditional metrics used to measure biometric 
system performance. These metrics include failure to enrol (FTE) and failure to acquire (FTA). The 
metrics are assigned as the end result of a biometric sample collection process, simply determining 
that some data collection error occurred that could be due to either the system or the user. HBSI 
metrics ask the question “What occurred during the data collection procedure to cause an FTE or 
FTA?” In order to answer this question, the entire sample collection procedure needs to be analysed, 
instead of just the end result. Video analysis for error coding is commonly used to determine what the 
error was caused by and when it occurred [12], [13]. In order to determine the error type, the HBSI 
methodology is applied. 
The concept for the Human-Biometric Sensor Interaction (HBSI) model was originally developed in 
2004 by researchers at Purdue University [14]. The model consists of multiple components that come 
together when a human uses a biometric system. Overlaps between each component are also 
essential when conducting an evaluation of a biometric system. The evaluation metrics of HBSI include 
ergonomics, usability and sample quality. Figure 1 shows how the elements of a biometric 
implementation and the associated evaluation characteristics interact, with the extractable metrics 
from HBSI forming the intersection between all components.  
Research into HBSI has progressed beyond original evaluations into an error framework shown in 
Figure 2. The HBSI Error Framework is used to classify a presentation made on behalf of the user to a 
biometric system as an error or a successfully processed sample (SPS). These classifications are 
determined based on presentations made to the system that are either correct or incorrect.  
 
Figure 1: HBSI Model [10] 
Determining the root cause of the error is essential, as researchers and businesses alike are interested 
in determining if it is due to a system error, a user presentation error, or a combination of the two. 
The five error metrics and one success metric are defined as follows: 
• Defective Interaction (DI) – An incorrect presentation that is not detected by the biometric 
system. 
• Concealed Interaction (CI) – An incorrect presentation that is detected by the biometric 
system but is classified incorrectly. The system accepts the presentation and the sample 
proceeds onto the general biometric model. 
• False Interaction (FI) – An incorrect presentation that is detected by the biometric system and 
classified correctly. This incorrect presentation is correctly handled by the system, rejecting 
the sample and providing feedback to the user. 
• Failure to Detect (FTD) – An FTD is a correct presentation that is not detected by the biometric 
system. 
• Failure to Process (FTP) – This correct presentation is detected by the system but due to 
system errors, is not processed or saved successfully. 
• Successfully Processed Sample (SPS) – A correct presentation that is both detected and 
processed correctly by the biometric system. 
 
These metrics have been successfully used for the assessment of fingerprint systems and have shown 
that clear distinctions of systems-related and user-related errors can be made within the analysis of 
system performance [6], [15]. 
 
Figure 2: HBSI Error Framework [11] 
3. The application of HBSI to Dynamic Signature Systems  
Applying dynamic signature to the HBSI model, the individual error metrics of this modality accurately 
map to the error framework. The potential errors that can occur in Dynamic Signature Verification 
(DSV) are as follows: 
• DI – The signature is deemed incorrect and no signature channel data is collected. Due to the 
incorrect presentation, the signature is not detected by the system. An example of this can 
occur if an incorrect stylus is used, causing the system to not detect the signature. 
• CI – The detected signature, although incorrect, is not identified by the biometric system as 
an error, and can subsequently be used within an enrolment or verification operation. This is 
the most dangerous type of error because it goes unnoticed by the system and accepted as 
an SPS. A successful signature forgery will result in a CI. 
• FI – The incorrect signature presentation is properly deemed erroneous and not allowed into 
the system. The signature may be deemed unrepresentative by the signer so they will hit the 
‘clear’ button, or the system will correctly reject a forgery. 
• FTD – The correctly-presented signature is not detected by the biometric system. This may 
occur due to temporal data recording issues, or possible system failure. 
• FTP – The signer has donated a correct signature that was detected by the system but a system 
error causes the signature to be unrepresentative of the subject, or simply fail to store it to 
the database. This may be caused by insufficient system memory or latency issues. 
As a temporal/behavioural biometric there are a number of additional considerations when applying 
HBSI to an interaction analysis. As samples are collected and analysed over a time period, rather an 
instance, it is possible for a subject to modify their donation behaviour during the capture period. For 
example, a signer might start signing their signature, reject the (partially completed) signature during 
the capture and then start the signature again. If the restarted signature is accepted by the signer 
then, in the context of the HBSI model, a single capture session has resulted in both an incorrect and 
correct presentation. 
This user-referred modification of behaviour is not unique to the signature modality as it can be 
observed in other behavioural modalities (for example gait). In applying the HBSI model we should 
strike a balance between ensuring meaningful application of the analysis and, in as far as is possible, 
applying a generic framework across all biometrics (physiological and behavioural). To enable a sub-
division of the capture process into abortive/incorrect and correct attempts we must first consider a 
harmonized set of definitions that enables the granulation of the capture process. 
3.1 Terminology 
Conflicting terminology in the field of biometrics exists in many different sources [16–19]. It is 
paramount to establish a set of universal terms in order to understand biometric processes across 
modalities. This research uses the following terms in describing the biometric capture process: 
interaction, presentation, attempt, and transaction. Previously validated for hand geometry in [20], 
this terminology can also be applied to signature. Figure 3 shows how these elements interact within 
a signature system. 
A transaction is defined as “the sequence of attempts to the system on the part of the user for the 
purpose of enrolment, verification or identification” [17]. An enrolment transaction includes all of the 
signatures donated by the user in order to create a biometric template. A verification transaction 
consists of all of the signatures donated by the user in effort to verify against their template. 
An attempt is defined as “the submission of one (or a sequence of) biometric samples to the system 
on the part of the user” [17]. In a DSV enrolment, it is common that one enrolment attempt will consist 
of multiple signatures (usually between 3 and 5). If the user is unable to enrol into the system in 3 
signatures, they will need to begin another attempt to enrol successfully. A transaction may consist of 
multiple attempts (i.e. enrolment or verification over time-separated transactions). Most signature 
enrolment and verification transactions will consist of a single attempt. 
Transaction
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Figure 3: Capture terminology applied to dynamic signatures 
 
The three signatures constituting an attempt are considered to be three separate presentations. A 
presentation is defined as “the submission of a single biometric sample to the system on the part of 
the user” [17]. Each time the user signs their signature, for means of enrolment or verification, will 
create a presentation of their signature to the biometric system on their behalf. 
Each presentation is made up of any number of interactions. An interaction is defined as “the action(s) 
that take place within a presentation” [20]. Interactions refer to all individual actions performed by 
the user during the signing process; such as creating the signature by interacting with the pen to write 
on the digitizer’s surface, or other interaction affecting the signature outcome such as accidentally 
placing their hand on the pressure pad. If successfully executed, a presentation may consist of a single 
interaction. Conversely, may interactions may exist within a presentation, which can either end with 
a successful or unsuccessful presentation within the HBSI model. 
The important issue here is addressing multiple interactions within a single presentation. The divide 
between an interaction and a presentation is necessary in order to understand how interaction errors 
affected the overall signature presentation. Each individual signature presentation is made up of many 
small interactions which may be correctly or incorrectly executed. Depending on the impact of an 
incorrect interaction, it may or may not result in the total presentation as being classified as correct 
or incorrect.  
3.2 User Reset (UR) State 
Importantly in the context of behavioural biometrics it is possible for a subject to restart or abandon 
a presentation. Within our four-stage terminology model each restart would be deemed a new 
interaction. To capture the behaviour of this possibility, we define a new state within the HBSI model 
– User Reset (UR). This is independent of whether a presentation is correct or incorrect and can occur 
at any point during donation. 
Within the dynamic signature modality, consider the scenario where a signer starts to sign correctly 
but is not satisfied with the signature being produced. The signer may be given an option to reset the 
signature (by clearing the screen and/or restarting the capture process) within a presentation 
procedure. The first interaction would be halted with an UR outcome, and a second interaction would 
then proceed which may result in a correct or incorrect presentation (or another UR). The application 
of the HBSI model to signatures therefore has outcomes of either a correct or incorrect presentation. 
An interaction may end with an UR whereby a new interaction starts and the presentation recording 
is reset. Apart from this minor addition to HBSI for behavioural modalities (including signature), the 
generic HBSI model previously devised is directly applicable. 
4. An assessment of signature systems using HBSI 
To assess the application of the revised HBSI model to signature modality systems, a series of 
interaction videos were recorded of subjects using a common signature enrolment and verification 
scenario. Twenty-six subjects were asked to enrol and then verify on a commercial signature 
verification engine. Subjects used two common tablet devices to capture signatures. Table 1 details 
these two devices. The first device employed a back-projected screen that displayed virtual ink as the 
test subject wrote on the tablet surface. Driven by the commercial verification software, this screen 
also contained an area for user interaction allowing a signer to confirm, reset or cancel as signature. 
The second device used a capture area that did not provide inking feedback as the user signed with 
an inkless pen (denoted non-inking). The signer could, however, see their signature being drawn 
during the signing process on a screen located on the same table as the inkless capture device. This 
study was denoted non-inking study 1. To analyse the interaction with the devices all sessions were 
recorded using two cameras mounted from the side and above the signature tablet. 
A series of performance statistics were extracted from the experiments. Alongside conventional 
enrolment and verification performance rates (including FTE and FTA) that show the performance of 
the engine, we also manually analysed the videos by encoding a series of interaction errors in the 
subjects’ signature donation sessions. Applying the HBSI model allowed individual responses to be 
classified as correct or incorrect presentations. Further to this, individual correctly presented samples 
were categorized as leading to an SPS or FTP. Likewise, incorrectly presented samples were also 
categorized leading to an FI or CI. 
To further investigate the use of the non-backlit digitizer (the most commonly deployed sensor) a 
further study was conducted using the same software (denoted non-inking study 2). This collection 
included 56 subjects, enrolling and then subsequently verifying against their template. Enrolments 
consisted of 3 signatures, and then the subjects had one attempt to verify on the system. For this 
second study, an operator controlled the donation process and was able to react to a request to 
restart/clear the signature, whereas in the first study the user could see their signature construction 
on a desk-mounted screen. 
Table 1: Sensor Specifications 










Non-inking 100 0-127 300 Semiconductive 88.9 x 53.1 
Virtual ink 100 0-127 300 Resistive 76.0 x 56.0 
In analysing the results the aims across all the studies documented in this paper were to a) investigate 
the performance differences between the major capture technologies and b) assess where these 
performance differences were caused by human or system based interaction issues. 
5. Results 
As an initial assessment it is possible to examine both devices across the three trials using the 
conventional system performance metrics exploring both the enrolment and verification statistics 
separately. Table 2 shows the enrolment statistics detailing the number of subjects and interactions 
within each trial. The larger number of interactions to subjects is indicative of the multiple attempts 
made to successfully donate three signatures. As can be seen, the majority of interactions were 
successful with most subjects being able to enrol on the first attempt. Only two subjects within each 
of the virtual ink and non-inking study 1 trials were unable to enrol on the system. 
These results show that although most subjects eventually able to enrol on the system using either 
capture technology, there are a large number of unsuccessful attempts. Conventional assessment 
would group together systems and user errors without exploring the reasons for these errors. 
Exploring the difference between non-inking studies 1 and 2 it is interesting to note the broad 
similarities between results. In study 2, a larger number of subjects were able to enrol at the first 
attempt with fewer unsuccessful enrolments (and no FTEs). This indicates that even though the 
hardware and software are a constant, the variables in the process are the cohort and the operator 
instructions provided to the cohort. If we consider both of these to be similar in composition it 
indicates the natural range of variability within a common scenario. This highlights the requirement 
to ensure that errors are correctly attributed to either system or user at each implementation, rather 
than assigning a global performance metric. 
Table 2: Enrolment statistics - conventional assessment 
Enrolment Statistics Virtual ink Non-inking Study 1 Non-inking Study 2 
Total attempts 45 36 62 
Total subjects 26 28 56 
Total unsuccessful (enrols) 20 44.44% 7 19.44% 2 3.23% 
Total successful (enrols) 24 53.33% 27 75.00% 56 90.32% 
Abandoned attempts 1 2.22% 2 5.56% 4 6.45% 
 
Enrolled first time (subjects) 18 69.23% 22 78.57% 54 96.43% 
Enrolled on 2nd attempt (subjects) 3 11.54% 3 10.71% 2 3.57% 
Enrolled on 3rd attempt (subjects) 2 7.69% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Enrolled on 4th attempt (subjects) 1 3.85% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
FTE (subjects) 2 7.69% 2 7.14% 0 0.00% 
 
Extending the conventional assessment to the verification results (Table 3) shows a marked contrast 
in the difference between the two technologies. In the virtual ink implementation the majority of 
successfully enrolled subjects were consequently unable to verify either as a first attempt or after 
multiple attempts. Both non-inking trials reversed this finding with most subjects being able to verify 
which supports the validity of signatures as a reliable biometric (it should be noted that non-inking 
study 2 only gave subjects one attempt to verify). However it is clear that by examining the total 
number of unsuccessful attempts there is an issue to explore into why these errors are occurring and 
precisely how many can be attributed to user interaction. 
Table 3: Verification statistics - conventional assessment 
Verification Statistics Virtual ink Non-inking Study 1 Non-inking Study 2 
Total attempts 50 61 55 
Total subjects 23 27 55 
Total unsuccessful (verify – 
multiple attempts) 30 60.00% 23 37.70% - - 
Total successful (verify – 
multiple attempts) 20 40.00% 37 60.66% - - 
 
Total unsuccessful (verify – first 
attempt only) 12 52.17% 17 62.96% 6 10.91% 
Total successful (verify – first 
attempt only) 11 47.83% 10 37.04% 49 89.09% 
 
Having assessed the conventional statistics which do not indicated where an error has occurred (only 
that an error has occurred) it is possible through the use of HBSI to assess why sub-optimal 
performance occurs. Table 4 shows the HBSI error states across the enrolment interactions, focusing 
explicitly on how errors are divided between user and systems. The first two lines of the table (labelled 
‘CP’ and ‘IP’) show that the majority of presentations across all input devices are correct indicating 
that the remaining error is due to software misclassification of inconsistent samples. Performance 
between capture devices was fairly uniform. Typically around 10% of the presentations contained a 
user-introduced error (IP). Examining the distribution of HBSI error states for the virtual-ink it can be 
seen that within the correct presentations (shaded in grey) a large percentage of errors (40%) were 
caused by a failure to process (FTP) – subjects here had successfully donated a signature but the 
system returned a non-match. This indicates that the virtual-ink capture technology introduced larger 
than normal variations within signature production. Usability errors within the virtual ink enrolment 
samples showed that the few samples that were incorrect presentations there was a mix between CI 
and FI. This shows that, in general, users didn’t have usability issues with the device even though it 
caused variation in production performance. Assessing the enrolment data from non-inking tablet 
studies it is evident that this tablet resulted in a larger number of SPS samples, even though roughly 
the same percentage of samples were CPs. This indicates a greater stability of signature data even 
without an ink feedback mechanism. Considerably fewer correct samples were misclassified (FTD/FTP) 
by the signature engine. Although few in number, all IPs were correctly identified as such by the 
system. A larger number of URs were also noted, particularly within study 2 where an operator 
controlled the reset operation. With respect to this in study 2 the operator could reset the signature 
without comparison while in study 1 a reset could have been called following a visual inspection of 
the remote image. 
Table 4: HBSI enrolment statistics 
Enrolment HBSI 
Statistics Virtual ink Non-inking Study 1 Non-inking Study 2 
CP 39 86.67% 31 86.11% 58 93.55% 
IP 6 13.33% 5 13.89% 4 6.45% 
 
SPS 21 46.67% 27 75.00% 56 90.32% 
FTP 18 40.00% 4 11.11% 1 1.61% 
FTD 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 1.61% 
FI 2 4.44% 3 8.33% 0 0.00% 
CI 3 6.67% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
UR 1 2.22% 2 5.56% 4 6.45% 
 
Table 5 shows these verification statistics when just considering the first attempt at verification. Only 
subjects that were able to enrol of the system were able to subsequently verify. Again it can be seen 
that the vast majority of presentations were correct (CP) across the three studies and the rates of the 
software successfully processing these very considerably, broadly in line with the enrolment statistics. 
Therefore our conclusions are that the virtual-ink capture technology introduced larger variations 
within signature production than for non-inking devices. No subjects generated UR requests within 
the verification process, indicating a habituation of process – ‘my signature has already be accepted 
in enrolment therefore I don’t need to reject any further’. This may not be a valid hypothesis for the 
non-inking system where a larger number of IPs are present. 
Table 6 shows the results from the verification presentations across the devices and studies when 
subsequent attempts are made to verify following a failure to verify (the results also including the first 
attempt). In each of the studies two (disjoint) subjects failed to enrol after six attempts and were 
deemed as FTE. Non-inking study 2 results are not included in this table as subjects only were given 
one chance to verify. 
Table 5: First attempt verification statistics 
Verification Statistics Virtual ink Non-inking Study 1 Non-inking Study 2 
CP 22 95.65% 22 81.48% 53 96.36% 
IP 1 4.35% 5 18.52% 2 3.64% 
       
SPS 11 47.83% 17 62.96% 49 89.09% 
FTP 11 47.83% 5 18.52% 4 7.27% 
FTD 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
FI 1 4.35% 5 18.52% 2 3.64% 
CI 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
UR 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
 
Table 6: HBSI verification statistics 
Verification Statistics Virtual ink Non-inking Study 1 
CP 47 94.00% 44 72.13% 
IP 3 6.00% 17 27.87% 
     
SPS 20 40.00% 23 37.70% 
FTP 27 54.00% 21 34.43% 
FTD 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
FI 3 6.00% 17 27.87% 
CI 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
UR 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
 
The analysis of the enrolment and verification results enable a more detailed inspection of the where 
errors were caused by incorrect presentations, and where these exist, where a biometric software 
system is able to accurately detect these. Our framework also includes the possibility that a correct 
presentation is not detected at all by the system. 
Focussing on incorrect presentations, the video-based analysis across the studies also allows an 
assessment of what caused the errors that contributed to an IP. The following errors occurred on the 
back projection with ink feedback:  
• Ink dispersed within the OK or Clear button – the software driving the back-projected tablet 
displayed a background image on the screen which contained a number of ‘buttons’ which the 
user could select a signature clear/reset, exit/abandon capture and an ‘OK’ button to signify 
successful signature competition. An error occasionally occurring during the an enrolment phase 
is that the user places the pen within the button area but the system stores this erroneously as an 
ink point rather than a user interaction (3 instances during enrolment). 
• Repeating parts of signature – The signer repeated parts of the signature due to ink feedback 
errors. This usually occurs when the pressure is not sufficient to register as a pen-down event or 
a latency error causes a delay in ink deposition (1 instance during verification). 
• Non-dispersal of ink – as above the ink is not deposited due to a system or user-pressure 
interaction error. The user doesn’t choose to repeat the missing parts of the signature (2 instances 
during enrolment, 2 instances during verification). 
• Hand on pressure pad – The signer touched the tablet with either a palm or finger causing an 
erroneous ‘pen’ record event. The occurrence of this depends on the topology of the capture 
technology as some tablets will only record events drawn by an induction pen (1 instance during 
enrolment) 
Using our new UR state, this can be (self) triggered by two events: 
• Clear button pressed – the signer pressed the clear button and restarted a signature. 
• User unhappy with signature – User abandons the signature during the signing process (1 instance 
during verification). 
On the non-inking tablet, the range of interaction errors included instances where the user introduced 
an erroneous event but, due to the lack of feedback, is unable to respond. The range of errors for the 
non-inking device includes: 
• Hand on pressure pad – The signer touched the tablet with either a palm or finger causing an 
erroneous ‘pen’ record. The subject may not know that they did it without seeing feedback (Study 
1 – 5 instances during enrolment, 2 instances during verification, Study 2 – 2 instances during 
enrolment, 1 instance during verification). 
• Ink dispersed within the OK or Clear button – although these buttons aren’t visible to the signer 
they exist within the software interface. It is therefore possible for a signer to draw within the 
button area (Study 1 –2 instances during verification, Study 2 – 2 instances during verification). 
• Repeating parts of signature – The signer repeated parts of the signature due to uncertainty when 
signing – again hampered by non-visual feedback (Study 2 – 1 instance during enrolment). 
• Pen pressure not registered/dispersed correctly – the signer used a pen pressure that was not 
detected by the tablet. With this capture technology the signer has no way or knowing whether 
an erroneous donation has occurred (Study 1 – 2 instances during enrolment, 16 instances during 
verification, Study 2 – 2 instances during enrolment). 
A UR state can be called if the user has an option to review their signature, for example on a remote 
screen. This was an option within the non-inking study 1 directly controlled by the signer whilst in 
study 2 the signer was able to interact with an operator to enable a reset. (Study 1 – 2 instances during 
enrolment, Study 2 - 4 instances during enrolment). 
Generically, there is also the possibility of a system (latency) error which means that nothing is 
captured during the signing process. 
Although there are a number of similarities in the types of user-errors found within the two devices 
there are a number of key differences that can be considered when designing a signature system.  
• Problems in ink dispersal within the virtual ink system causes problems with users abandoning 
presentations (UR) and modifying through repetition. 
• Hands/fingers on the tablet surface causes major issues on technologies that detect pressure 
(rather than by induction coil pen). This was more prevalent on the non-feedback devices where 
a signer would be unaware of the production of an erroneous event. Ideally x and y coordinate 
streams should be filtered to remove sudden movements that are out of scope for normal 
signature production.  
• Incorporating virtual buttons, which may be visually the best solution causes issues a) when a 
signer accidentally places the pen in the button zone as part of the signature – triggering an 
‘accept’ or ‘cancellation’ event or b) an attempt to press a button is recorded as part of the 
signature. Special consideration should be given to the distance between the sizing zone and 
virtual buttons, or removing the virtual buttons altogether, with ‘accept’ or ‘cancellation’ events 
triggers by other mechanisms. 
Assessing these erroneous events it is possible to map a flow through the process of collecting a 
signature on different capture technologies. Figure 4 and 5 define the capture process flow of the 
virtual ink and non-inking capture technologies respectively. These charts define the sequence of 
events within an interaction with each of the decision points denoted with an identifier. By exploring 
the HBSI events that lead from each of these decisions it is possible to tie each to a particular outcome. 
These are shown in Table 7 and Table 8 and serve as a reference for the HBSI errors that can occur.  
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Figure 4: Virtual Ink Process Flow 
Table 7: Virtual ink process-to-HBSI mapping 
Decision Point Action Outcome 
V1 No If CP - FTD. If IP - DI. UR if subsequently abandoned 
V2 Yes 
FTP if feedback detached from sample donation 
pen movement (i.e. a CP event)*. UR if 
subsequently abandoned, else CI if successfully 
enrolled/verified, FI if rejected 
V3 No UR if subsequently abandoned, else CI if successfully enrolled/verified, FI if rejected 
V4 No UR if subsequently abandoned. CI if successfully enrolled/verified, FI if rejected 
V5 No To V7 
V6 Yes SPS 
V7 Yes UR 
V7 No 
CI if successfully enrolled/verified, FI if rejected. 
Assumes that an IP has been donated to route 
through the V5 decision box 
V8 Yes UR 
V9 Yes UR 
V10  Inheriting outcome from V4 
* Latency issues may be caused by either a delay prior to recording the sample data and displaying 
the ink (recording delay) or after data has been recorded (display delay). We assume that if a display 
delay has occurred, a CP has been donated, whereas a recording delay would result in an IP. 
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Figure 5: Non-inking System Process Flow 
Table 8: Non-inking process-to-HBSI mapping 
Decision Point Action Outcome 
P1 No If CP - FTD. If IP - DI. UR if abandoned 
P2 Yes If CP - FTP. If IP - CI if successfully enrolled/verified, FI if rejected. UR if abandoned 
P3 No CI if successfully enrolled/verified, FI if rejected. UR if abandoned 
P4 No If CP - FTP. If IP - CI if successfully enrolled/verified, FI if rejected. UR if abandoned 
P5 No To P8 
P5 Yes SPS 
P6 Yes UR 
P6 No 
CI if successfully enrolled/verified, FI if rejected. 
Assumes that an IP has been donated to route 
through the P5 decision box 
P7 Yes UR 
P8 Yes UR 
P9 Yes UR 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we have analysed the performance of automatic biometric signature systems both in 
terms of overall system performance and interaction usability. Using the HBSI framework and 
modifying this to include a new state of UR to include the condition whereby a subject resets their 
donation process, we have demonstrated the ability of the analysis framework to pin-point where 
errors occur within the signature modality. 
It is encouraging to note the high performance of the signature systems, including the large number 
of samples that are donated without any usability error. We have, however, noted a number of 
common issues that can occur and need to be accounted for. It was evident that having ‘Reset’ and 
‘OK’ buttons within the signing area caused a problem, as did the user touching the signing surface 
during capture, thereby depositing erroneous ink. The other major error was the non-deposition of 
ink cause either by latency issues or by insufficient pressure being applied to the tablet surface. These 
problems can be solved through the design of appropriate on-screen user interfaces and hardware 
surrounds to protect the signing surface from additional finger interaction. 
It is important to remember that, within the process of signing, the element of ceremony plays an 
important role with respect to the quality of provided signature. If the signature signifies an element 
of high importance (for example, on a legal document) the user typically signs with greater care, 
striving for enhanced quality and clarity. This must be considered when applying a signature system 
to a particular scenario – are there likely to be more URs due to the signer ensuring that the signature 
is correct or is process speed of essence? 
One effect that wasn’t noticed in this current trial but that can affect the outcome of temporally stored 
data is a signer embellishing a signature with an underline or a character modification following the 
completion of the normal signature. This would be collected at the end of temporal data and would 
thus cause a potential issue for dynamic systems where two sequences are compared. Embellishing a 
signature after previous enrolment will also incur an incorrect presentation in the HBSI methodology. 
Although this study was designed as a pilot to assess proof of concept in applying HBSI to signature 
systems (and behavioural biometrics more widely) we have shown clear indicators of how the 
framework reveals a finer granularity in assigning errors that can be utilised within the design and 
assessment of biometric systems (signature or otherwise). Within the signature modality, future work 
will focus on the testing on other types of digitizers – although the two main technologies have been 
assessed in the current trial, both were assessed within a desk-bound environment. The growth of 
mobile devices and scenarios leads to a natural extension of this work. We also aim to calculate 
usability errors automatically from video processes and systems logs, thereby increasing the 
immediate practicality of the application of this method. 
Whilst we have used signature systems as an exemplar of a behavioural biometric, other biometric 
modalities in the genre (for example, gait [21] and speech) can be assessed using the same method. 
With the addition of the UR state, subject interactions can be labelled as either incorrect or correct 
presentations, with the option to abort and reset the capture operation. This process is common to 
all behavioural biometrics and highlights the generic nature of the framework. The UR state is also 
found in some physiological biometrics, such as a hand geometry system which uses a PIN to access 
the user’s template. 
The HBSI methodology has adapted well to the behavioural modality of signature, without needing 
any major redesigns. In order to complete the model for universal adaptation, it still needs to be tested 
in more modalities. Work will continue to explore the application of the HBSI methodology to other 
behavioural modalities or complex systems involving temporal biometric processes and token 
presentations. Further research into this field will help to strengthen and improve this model. 
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